I will be on the academic job market in the Fall of 2023, and available for interviews.

I am a sixth year PhD candidate at Universität Mannheim, Germany, and researcher in the Junior Research Group Competition and Innovation at ZEW Mannheim.

My main research interests lie in Industrial Organization, specifically platform and information design, innovation and search. I sometimes dabble with privacy as well.


Job Market Paper

    Consumer Search and Firm Strategy with Multi-Attribute Products - Download the most recent version

    Abstract: I study a model of directed search in which a consumer inspects products whose valuations are correlated through shared attributes. The consumer discovers her valuation for the attributes of the inspected products and adapts her search strategy based on what she has learned. The consumer anticipates the optimal paths that arise after different realizations; this generates a search rule that accounts for learning systematically. In this search environment, a multiproduct seller commits to a menu of horizontally differentiated products. The seller can exploit the fact that the emerging search paths reveal the consumer's preferences: by setting different prices for ex ante identical products, the seller can encourage specific paths to arise and exploit the information that the consumer learned through search. In some cases, the seller optimally limits the set of available products.

Working Papers

  • Platform-Enabled Information Disclosure - with Martin Peitz - SSRN - Video presentation
  • Abstract: We analyze consumers’ voluntary information disclosure in a platform setting. For given consumer participation, the platform and sellers tend to prefer limited disclosure of consumer valuations, in contrast to consumers. With endogenous consumer participation, seller and platform incentives may be misaligned, and sellers may be better off when consumers can disclose their valuations. A regulator acting in the best interest of consumers and/or sellers may want to intervene and force the platform to employ a disclosure technology that enables consumers to voluntarily disclose information from a richer message space.

  • Not as Good as it Used to be: Do Streaming Platforms Penalize Quality? - with Luca Sandrini - SSRN
  • Abstract: We study the incentives of a streaming platform to bias consumption when products are vertically differentiated. The platform offers mixed bundles of content to monetize consumers' interest in variety and pays royalties to sellers based on the effective consumption of the content they produce. When products are not vertically differentiated, the platform has no incentive to bias consumption in equilibrium: the platform being active represents a Pareto-improvement compared to the case in which she is not. With vertical differentiation, royalties can differ; the platform always biases recommendations in favor of the cheapest content, which hurts consumers and the high-quality seller. Biased recommendation always diminishes the incentives of a seller to increase the quality of her content for a given demand. If a significant share of the users is ex-ante unaware of the existence of the sellers the platform can bias recommendations more freely, but joining the platform encourages investment in quality. The bias, however, can lead to inefficient allocation of R&D efforts. From a policy perspective, we propose this as a novel rationale for regulating algorithmic recommendations in streaming platforms.

  • Regulatory Compliance with Limited Enforceability: Evidence from Privacy Policies - with Bernhard Ganglmair, Julia Krämer - SSRN
  • Abstract: The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of 2018 introduced stringent transparency rules compelling firms to disclose the nature of their data collection, processing, and use in accessible and readable language. The disclosure requirement is objective, and its compliance is verifiable. However, readability is subjective and vague, making it difficult to enforce. We examine the effect of this asymmetric enforceability of regulatory rules on firms’ compliance using a large sample of privacy policies from German firms between 2014 and 2021, matched with firm-level and industry-level information. We use text-as-data techniques to construct measures of disclosure and readability and show that firms responded to the GDPR’s transparency requirements by significantly increasing information disclosure. However, the readability of their privacy policies did not improve and, in some cases, worsened. Larger firms and those in concentrated industries demonstrated higher compliance levels with the readability requirement, potentially due to heightened regulatory scrutiny. We emphasize the significance of regulatory capacity, as higher-budget regulators (German state-level data protection authorities) with better enforcement capabilities foster improved compliance with the vague rules and guidance of the readability requirement. This study sheds light on the intricate dynamics between enforceability, compliance, and the role of verifiability within regulatory frameworks.


  • Mikroökonomik A, 2021/2022 - Teaching Assistant for Prof. Thomas Tröger, Universität Mannheim
  • Mikroökonomik A, 2019/2020 - Teaching Assistant for Prof. Thomas Tröger, Universität Mannheim
Conference Organization
Conferences & Workshops
Conferences & Workshops
  • Presented "Self-Steering and Multi-Product Pricing" (old title) at HEC Liège's ECON seminar - Feb. 16, 2023 - Liège (Belgium)
Conferences & Workshops
  • Presented "Readability and Disclosure in Privacy Policies: Evidence from the GDPR" (old title) at the 2022 EALE Annual Conference - Sept. 15/16, 2022 - Carcavelos, Lisbon (Portugal)

Back to top

Website design courtesy of Vasilios Mavroudis Update cookies preferences